

Introduction: Thailand and the “Good Coup”

MICHAEL K. CONNORS* and KEVIN HEWISON**

*School of Social Sciences, La Trobe University, Melbourne, Australia

**Carolina Asia Center, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Chapel Hill, USA

The last time the *Journal of Contemporary Asia* produced a special issue on Thailand, in 1978 (Volume 8, No. 1), it was a response to the events surrounding the military coup on 6 October 1976. That coup marked the bloody end of an important three-year democratic interlude that has come to be seen as a prelude to the democratisation of Thailand's politics over the following three decades. At the time – and this was reflected in the special issue – the focus was on the destruction of democratic politics and the remarkable divisions in Thai society as rightists sought to crush the left.

The 1973–76 period, while one where participatory political practices re-emerged, was also one of great instability, with elections failing to produce stable governments. As governments came and went, politically motivated murders and intimidation became increasingly common and the downward spiral of political conflict became a whirlpool.

But there were also some achievements during this turbulent period which left their mark on future political activity. Politics came to be defined more widely as both workers and the rural majority acquired a political voice, at least for a time. In addition, the problems of rural development were addressed seriously for the first time in decades. Many of those who were to become significant in the 1980s and 1990s gained valuable experience in the struggles of 1973–76. Some were students and academics, others former civil and military bureaucrats who attained positions in political parties, while others were from business, testing the political waters.

Many of those politicised in 1973 were radicalised by vicious attacks from increasingly ruthless rightists. In the Cold War atmosphere of the time, Thailand's elite was greatly concerned by communist victories in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. In particular, the collapse of the monarchy in Laos alarmed Thailand's King Bhumibol Adulyadej, causing him to support rightists. Groups of right-wing thugs, the military and the police violently opposed reform and attacked those they saw as radicals, forcing many to seek refuge with the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT).

Correspondence Address: Michael K. Connors, School of Social Sciences, La Trobe University, Bundoora 3086, Melbourne, Australia. Email: michael.connors@latrobe.edu.au

The final act in the failure of democratic reform was played out when rightists attacked student protesters on 6 October 1976. The violence was unprecedented, with hundreds being lynched, shot, raped and burned alive. Following the coup, thousands fled to the CPT jungle bases or went overseas, fearing arrest or imprisonment.

The articles of the 1978 special issue focused on these issues and the unprecedented social divisions and class struggles that had been revealed by the events summarised above. It was not until the 1980s that these divisions were ameliorated through a period of military-led political tutelage, much of it under General Prem Tinsulanond's government that promoted semi-democracy – “Thai-style democracy,” with the king as head of state – and rapid economic development.

That a second *Journal of Contemporary Asia* special issue on Thailand should be produced following another coup is entirely appropriate. Thaksin Shinawatra, the only Thai prime minister to win two successive general elections, was overthrown on 19 September 2006.¹ Projecting himself as the political saviour of the domestic capitalist class following the 1997 economic meltdown, Thaksin led a political party that had changed the nature of Thailand's politics while also generating remarkable divisions within the country. Since the coup, these divisions have become deeper as the palace, military and bureaucracy embed their power and stake out positions of dominance in Thai society.

When the “Council for Democratic Reform under Democracy with the King as Head of State” (later renamed the Council of National Security), seized power in the first military coup since 1991, it abrogated the supreme law of the land, the 1997 Constitution. The junta did so with good reason as Article 65 allowed peaceful resistance to illegal seizures of power. Of course, the junta's interim constitution absolved them of any wrongdoing. Martial law was imposed and maintained across much of the country, particularly in areas considered sympathetic to Thaksin. The junta's interim constitution allowed them monopoly control over the appointment of the cabinet and the unicameral National Legislative Assembly. It also gave the junta the ability to select the Constitutional Drafting Assembly that put together a draft constitution that most commentators criticised as watering down hard-won political rights. That these bodies, largely composed of state officials, academics and military and royalist cronies predictably took a more conservative legislative and constitutional perspective was no surprise. The draft constitution was to allow the palace, the military and the bureaucracy to reassume a guardian role over the legislature that the 1997 Constitution had removed. Drafted under the watchful conservative eye of former intelligence officer and National Security Council Chair, Prasong Soonsiri, a key anti-Thaksin opponent, this outcome was hardly surprising, as elements of the bureaucratic and military classes were always resistant to the growing power of the bourgeois and professional political classes over the state.

The coup also led to a reprise of highly conservative and nationalist discourses regarding the nature of Thai democracy, of national forms of capitalism, and to new state-led education campaigns teaching people the “proper” exercise of citizenship. It also raised the volume of royalist propaganda to a level not seen since the absolute monarchy was overthrown in 1932. And yet, the military has had to recognise that Thailand has seen considerable democratic development since it had last seized power in 1991. The 1992 civilian uprising was a defiant rejection of the military's

attempt to embed their political role into the future. Hence, in 2006-07, the military junta has had to retain significant elements of the 1997 Constitution – including independent agencies, the human rights commission, and protection for human rights – but the conservatives were to gain more control over these agencies than allowed for by the 1997 charter. In addition, the conservatives were able to insert clauses in the draft constitution that permitted them to manage parliament (e.g. through a partially appointed Senate).

The presence of some liberal elements in the draft constitution was not surprising, given that the constitution had to pass a referendum and to do that it needed to maintain the support of the political parties, media, activists and intellectual groupings that had thrown their support behind the “good coup.” Indeed, the draft constitution makes a play of liberal intentions while embedding so-called Thai-style democracy or, in the military-inspired language of the past 2-3 decades, a “democratic system with the king as head of state.”

Inevitably, the tense and pragmatic nature of this alliance between the royalist-military junta and what Ji Ungpakorn (2007) aptly describes as “tank liberals” was revealed. This was demonstrated when the junta sought a draconian national security law that entrenched the political role of security forces, which was strongly opposed by various elements of the liberal sectors. Even before this, however, a range of anti-coup groups have sprung up, some with connections to Thaksin’s powerful network, some opposed to the coup, and others opposed to both Thaksin and to the coup. The junta initially allowed protests in Bangkok, so long as these were limited. However, as the protests grew in size, the military cracked down, and sought to portray the protests as a regroupment of Thaksin forces. In the countryside – especially in the north and north-east, the bastions of Thaksin’s Thai Rak Thai (TRT) Party support – the junta has implemented a range of draconian measures to thwart resistance to the coup. In these areas, for example, the military has mobilised significant forces to coerce support for the draft constitution.

The junta has thus worked incessantly to demobilise the so-called Thaksin regime and to flush out “political undercurrents.” In part, this is to destroy TRT’s support base and has involved charging Thaksin with graft, freezing his assets, dissolving the TRT Party and banning its leadership from politics. Moving from its limited tolerance of dissent in Bangkok in the early months after the coup, the junta imprisoned anti-coup leaders who, in mid-July 2007, led a demonstration against Privy Councillor General Prem Tinsulanonda, accusing him of masterminding the coup and calling for his resignation.

A Good Coup?

Is this the “good coup” that the royalist-military and their supporters trumpeted when the tanks rattled through Bangkok’s streets? In the broadest of terms, it may be granted that reformist soldiers, in certain times and places, might overthrow a despicable and belligerent regime for a perceived public good or national interest. It is clear that a large proportion of the Bangkok-based middle class, the royalist elite, a swathe of political activists, some business people and large numbers in the south believed that the military conducted a “good coup” to rid the country of the Thaksin government and to rescue them from authoritarianism. Representative of such

thinking was the renowned liberal and former liberal Foreign Minister Surin Pitsuwan (2006): “The Sep 19, 2006 coup in Thailand was necessary – a corrective measure – in that it saved the country from the clutches of authoritarianism.” More recently, Nitya Pibulsonggram, Foreign Minister in the junta-appointed government, described the coup as a temporary “glitch” on Thailand’s road to democracy (*International Herald Tribune*, 1 August 2007).

Undoubtedly, for millions more, largely from the north and north-east, this was a “bad coup,” for it removed from office the one government that had largely delivered on its electoral promises and provided them with a political voice. As attested by his remarkable re-election landslide in 2005 and the support TRT received in the voided election of April 2006, the rural masses and urban poor were strong supporters of Thaksin and TRT.

Many will read this good/bad coup as support for Anek Laothammata’s (1996) argument that Thai democracy is a tale of two democracies: where the rural masses elect vote-buying politicians, and the urban middle class, frustrated by the corrupt and inept nature of such governments rally to bring them down by weight of social sanction, protest and persuasion (and, in this latest episode, by cheering on a “good coup”).

The allure of Anek’s widely accepted model has been especially evident in post-coup discussions of how the masses were misled and/or bought by Thaksin and TRT (Anek, 2007). Yet, even on its own terms the two democracies thesis is found wanting. A major reason for the popularity of this explanation of Thailand’s politics is to be found in its reductionism and crude instrumentalism. Important class structures and struggles, complex regional-business-ideological networks, intra-elite conflict and ongoing grassroots struggles cannot be reduced to a simplistic dichotomy. But the model does work well in ideological terms, for in reducing the complexities of the Thai social formation to a series of political cycles that edge ever closer to a democratic idyll, capitalist modernisation is reaffirmed, and the role of the middle class in that process is extolled.

A problem with the two democracies thesis is that the 2006 coup came at a time when Thailand’s capitalist class had been rescued from the jaws of destruction during the 1997 financial crisis and had for the first time taken political power into its own hands. Thaksin was Thailand’s most prominent capitalist and he was prime minister at the head of a government that looked rather like the executive committee of the bourgeoisie. More significantly, TRT had won two elections with the largest votes ever achieved in Thailand’s electoral history. Arguably, this control should have been the best possible political shell for capitalist rule. So what happened to cause an undoubtedly popular capitalist-cum-prime minister and a successful government to be thrown out after its astonishing 2005 landslide electoral victory?

The 2006 coup does not lend itself to any simple analysis. While plans for the putsch had been mulled for some time, the coup was not inevitable. It is clear that a range of class-structured intra-elite struggles at different levels, individual, political, corporate and ideological, coalesced and produced the conditions for the coup. Explaining the coup event is one thing, but understanding the struggles involved is a far greater challenge. While not an exhaustive account, the articles in this special issue address a number of the critical struggles that saw Thaksin and TRT defeated.

In the first article in this collection, "Toppling Democracy," **Thongchai Winichakul** contextualises the 2006 coup with an extended discussion of Thailand's chequered history of democratisation. In the dominant historiography of Thai democratisation, Thongchai identifies two arguments: a simplistic liberal view of democratisation involving moves to push the military out of politics; and a royalist account that is fundamentally anti-democratic but concocts a story of royals as promoters and supporters of democratisation. Thongchai offers an alternative approach, suggesting a serial history of democratisation that allows us to observe the long duration of layered historical processes in Thailand's democratisation. He argues that despite the overthrow of the absolute monarchy in 1932, the monarchy and monarchists – despite waxing and waning political fortunes – have played the most significant role in shaping Thai democracy. Ironically, their role and place in history has been overlooked due to the perception that the constitutional monarchy is "above politics." Thongchai argues that, especially since the student-led uprising in October 1973, royalists have been able to assume a superior status and claim the high moral ground that places them above elected politicians and the tawdry day-to-day events of political activity. With a distaste for electoral politics, and in collaboration with the so-called people's sector, activists and intellectuals, royalists and the palace have successfully undermined electoral democracy in the name of "clean politics" and against the well-known corruption of elected politicians. In this broad historical account, Thongchai is able to show that the 2006 coup that toppled democracy was but the latest effort by monarchists to take and maintain control of the democratisation process.

Oliver Pye and Wolfram Schaffar analyse the events prior to the coup, examining the genesis and development of an anti-Thaksin movement that quickly developed into mass protests against the billionaire Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra in the early months of 2006. Hundreds of thousands of people took part in demonstrations that brought about a deep political crisis and forced Thaksin to call snap elections. While this crisis was partly a result of intra-elite conflict, the anti-Thaksin protests opened up political space that was soon filled by a range of organisations that railed against Thaksin government policies promoting Free Trade Agreements, privatisation, and authoritarian, corporate-dominated politics. Pye and Schaffar suggest that, while Thaksin did develop considerable popular support through "populist" policies, these policies were in fundamental contradiction with the government's "post neo-liberal" capitalist restructuring project. They indicate how the People's Alliance for Democracy (PAD), formed in early 2006, was not simply a royalist and middle-class plot to overthrow Thaksin, but was a much more broadly based movement promoting a range of oppositions to TRT policies. At the same time, by May 2006, it was clear that those within PAD who considered that it should have a radical strategy to challenge the dominant call for palace intervention in ousting Thaksin were sadly lacking any support base. This strategic political failure saw the elite element of PAD gain the upper hand, leading to royal intervention and the coup.

In their article, "Thaksin's Populism," **Pasuk Phongpaichit and Chris Baker** look to the Latin American experience with populism in assessing Thaksin's progression from being a businessman trying his hand at electoral politics to a populist politician. They show that Thaksin was not a populist when he rose to power but that through stages over the next five years Thaksin's populism went beyond the redistributive

policies associated with the TRT to include a rhetorical rejection of Thailand's political elite and the denigration of liberal democracy in favour of "personalised authoritarianism." Thaksin's populism can be seen as a response to the demands of the poor that had resulted from decades of capitalist development. The authors' exploration of the social bases for Thaksin's electoral success provides a compelling analysis of the direction of Thaksin's politics. By illustrating Thaksin's tentative and then full embrace of populism in the context of Thailand's political economy and class structure, Pasuk and Baker demonstrate that, for all of its apparent strength, there was a fragility to Thaksin's rule. The authors account of the conditions in which Thaksin rose – economic crisis, legal threats to his position, and the make-up of TRT – provides the basis to understand Thaksin's vulnerabilities and his populism. Pasuk and Baker also alert us to the fact that Thaksin's brand of populism came to be feared by the urban middle class who were mobilised against him and his party in the lead up to the September 2006 *coup*.

Andrew Walker's study of voting is based on extensive ethnographic fieldwork in northern Thailand. His article does much to address images of rural people as ignorant or manipulated voters who damage democracy. Walker points out that the 2006 coup derived considerable ideological legitimacy from the view that the TRT government's mandate was illegitimate because it had either duped unsophisticated voters, bought their votes or had manipulated them. In other words, democratic development was being held back because rural voters are parochial, lack political sophistication, are vulnerable to vote buying and to the influence of electoral canvassers. Walker's research challenges such perceptions. Referring to a "rural constitution," Walker suggests that this set of values provides a basis for judgements about the exercise of political power in electoral contexts. The rural constitution is embedded in the everyday politics of discussion, gossip and debate about the attributes of leaders, resource allocation, development projects and administrative competence. The rural constitution is identified as having three main provisions: a preference for local candidates; an expectation that candidates will support their electorate; and an emphasis on strong and transparent administration. Walker does not deny electoral decisions based on disinterest, disengagement, disillusionment and vote buying, but he insists that these strategies need to be placed in the broader context of everyday political values. He also makes the useful observation that candidates and political canvassers are socially embedded in complex and overlapping networks of relationships in local areas. Rural voters thus find themselves linked in multiple ways with local figures on all sides of political contests, with the rural constitution providing an unwritten "road map" for voters. From this perspective, in the area of Walker's fieldwork, TRT candidates were elected because a majority of voters considered TRT the most attractive party. Walker suggests that a failure to recognise the legitimacy of rural electoral decision making is a fundamental threat to Thailand's democracy.

Somchai Phatharathananunth also takes up the issue of elections, in this case, in the TRT stronghold of north-eastern Thailand. The populous north-east has about one-third of the country's electors and so is crucial for the national electoral success of any party, and Somchai examines TRT successes there in 2001 and 2005. He discusses the debate over whether TRT's electoral success was based on the appeal of its policies or the power of Thaksin's money. In the end, Somchai considers this

either/or dichotomy too simplistic and shows that the party's success was seen to result from a combination of attractive policies, access to campaign funds, evidence of service delivery (or *phon ngan*) by incumbent and potential politicians and the integration of already existing political networks into TRT. Indeed, Somchai shows that TRT's landslide electoral victory in 2005 in the north-east owed most to party mergers and access to candidates with established political networks in their electorate. Challenging simplistic notions of rural docility and idiocy, Somchai also reflects on the important issue of support for the anti-Thaksin movement in the north-east and considers that TRT's policies played a role. Noting that north-eastern farmers had been at the forefront of various social movements and protests in the 1990s, Somchai observes that appeals by NGO leaders for farmers to join the anti-Thaksin movement failed. This response appears to derive from an assessment of the interests served by TRT policies.

Moving the analysis to the institutional level, the interests involved in the struggles leading up to the coup become complex indeed. The articles that examine the institutional level focus on the military, the constitution (and related political struggles for power) and the monarchy. **Ukrist Pathmanand** characterises the 2006 coup as an event that was more than a simple case of the Thai military again seizing power. The coup is assessed as having been intimately connected to the monarchy. The "royalist military" legitimated the coup by using the royalist discourse that was generated by the anti-Thaksin movement and the more generalised propaganda associated with this king's reign. Ukrist takes up the question of the military's corporate interests in extended fashion. By contrasting the 2006 and 1991 coup groups he offers insights into the unformed nature of the 2006 coup group – indicating that its rush to power was a product of circumstance and palace-based beckoning. He also recounts a fascinating story of intra-military competition between Thaksin supporters and palace supporters directed by Privy Councillor General Prem Tinsulanonda. While he indicates that the 2006 coup group did not have the same common business and military academy interests as the 1991 group, Ukrist notes that once in power the coup group has moved to shore up its corporate interests in a range of state enterprises and elsewhere. Ominously, the coup group has moved to ensure strong internal security mechanisms that grant greater power to the bureaucracy and the military, including a strong homeland security organisation and the reintroduction of appointed senators.

Michael K. Connors examines the vociferous calls for the king to utilise his supposed powers under Article 7 of the 1997 Constitution to throw Thaksin out and appoint a prime minister of his choice. These calls were seen as a way to end the political crisis that wracked Thailand in 2006. While these calls were loudest amongst the elite faction of PAD, they were, in fact, made more broadly. Connors assesses that these calls were consistent with the disposition of Thai liberalism. He argues that the paradox of liberals seeking an extra-constitutional solution to end Thaksin's popular rule stems from the agnosticism of liberalism to majoritarian democracy. A major concern of Connors' piece is to illustrate that Thaksin's authoritarian rule, and his capacity to lead a new form of regime based on a class base of rural masses, led to a range of social mobilisations against him (as also discussed by Pye and Schaffar). The specific challenges that emerged with Thaksin's rise led liberals to use royalist ideas to prevent what they conceived as a Thaksin-led assault on the 1997

Constitution. Key among these ideas was the notion of sovereignty as expressed in the relationship between the monarch and the people, or *rachaprachasamasai*. In the end, the failure of “royal liberalism” to bring an end to the political crisis through appeals to this relationship and the acceptance of the coup, may well signal a more general failure of royal liberalism to secure political order in the future.

In examining the corporate interests involved in the events surrounding Thaksin’s rise and the coup, there have been some limited attempts to portray the battle between Thaksin and the palace as a battle of capital. Indeed, a book by INN News (2006: 34-7) implies that the conflict was unmistakably a battle between old *sakdina* or feudal capital (represented by the palace) and new capital (represented by Thaksin). There have been extensive discussions of Thaksin’s economic power (see, for example, McCargo and Ukrist, 2005; Pasuk and Baker, 2004). However, to assess the new versus old capital proposition adequately, greater research into the business interests of the monarchy is required. While the monarchy’s political role has been discussed since the 2006 coup, its economic foundations, activities and role have not been examined seriously. To begin this, **Porphant Ouyyanont** provides the first ever comprehensive examination of the Crown Property Bureau’s (CPB) investments and wealth (the CPB is the monarchy’s investment arm).

To understand the monarchy’s economic power better, Porphant examines how the 1997 crisis affected the CPB. At the time, the Bureau was particularly vulnerable because of its dependence on the performance of two private companies in which the Bureau was a major shareholder – the Siam Commercial Bank and the Siam Cement Group. Both companies were in sectors hard hit by the crisis. He examines how the CPB survived the crisis by making changes in its management and investment policies, and by promoting similar reforms in the two companies. The result is that the CPB emerged from the crisis with an income significantly higher than even its peak pre-crisis level. Porphant assesses the total wealth of the CPB at some \$US41 billion.

This huge wealth is not far short of the assets of the world’s two wealthiest people in 2004: Bill Gates (\$46.6 billion) and Warren Buffett with \$42.9 billion (Forbes.com, 2004). While this institutional wealth is not equivalent to the personal wealth of the royal family or any of its individual members, it is ironic that King Bhumibol presides over an immense institutional and personal fortune, including major industrial enterprises, while encouraging Thais to adopt his ideas about “sufficiency economy” (*setthakit pho phiang*), encouraging his people to make do with what they have, to moderate their desires, reduce their greed and to not be too ambitious. That the royalist military has made this notion a marker of its royalist national ideology is significant in marking its policies as different from those of the Thaksin government.

In his article, **Kevin Hewison** also takes up the issue of competition between the monarchy and Thaksin as an essential background for the coup. This article examines the coup as a clash of elites within the Thai ruling class – with Thaksin and the king as representative of these elites. This analysis begins with an assessment of Paul Handley’s (2006) important book, *The King Never Smiles. A Biography of Thailand’s Bhumibol Adulyadej*, the controversy that surrounded its publication and the supposed threat the book posed to the monarchy. Handley’s evaluation of the increasing involvement of King Bhumibol’s palace in Thailand’s modern politics is considered a way to examine the clash of elites within the ruling class that, despite

the anti-Thaksin movement's breadth, led to what was a conservative and royalist campaign against the Thaksin government. As various measures taken to force Thaksin out came to nothing, the royalists gave their support to the military and the planning of the coup.

In what sense can a class perspective also inform our understanding of the events? At one level it is apparent that, in part at least, the struggles associated with Thaksin's rule and his overthrow were motivated by competition between fractional capitalist interests, which hardened into competing blocs as the crisis accentuated. It is no surprise to see that the CPB is now the largest investor on Thailand's stock exchange (Mellor, 2007). By itself, the intra-capital struggle does not explain the coup. Political and ideological factors are critical.

It is worth recalling that political and social innovations, such as the extension of the franchise, are supported by a ruling class when these innovations do not threaten the existing social order. Liberals like Bentham and Mill made arguments in favour of reform in Britain in these terms, suggesting that the newly-enfranchised masses would be "responsible" with their new political powers (see Macpherson, 1977: 37, 42). However, as Robison et al. (1993: 33) observed, this attraction to democratic means of maintaining state power is contingent. In cases where the power of the masses threaten to play a determining political role, the allegiance to democratic political forms diminishes. In the case of Thailand under Thaksin, it is clear that rival elites in the ruling class held conflicting visions of political regimes and their ideologies of legitimacy.

This volume presents an attempt to understand the Thaksin ascendancy, its ideological, class and institutional base, the oppositional movements that took shape against it, and the forces that eventually overthrew it. These stories are not a seamless linear narrative, and we hope that this collection will give rise to further work that attempts to unravel the political dynamics of the Thai social formation.

Note

¹ Some argue that Thaksin and TRT were elected three times. However, in a somewhat contrived legal decision, the April 2006 election was annulled following the king's characterization of the election as undemocratic. That election became farcical when the opposition parties boycotted, leaving TRT as the only likely winner.

References

- Anek Laothamatas (1996) "A Tale of Two Democracies: Conflicting Perceptions of Elections and Democracy in Thailand," in R. Taylor (ed.), *The Politics of Elections in Southeast Asia*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 201-23.
- Anek Laothamatas (2007) *Thaksina-prachaniyom [Thaksin-style Populism]*, Bangkok: Matichon Books.
- Forbes.com (2004) "The World's Richest People," 26 February, <http://www.forbes.com/2004/02/25/bill04land.html> (downloaded 1 August 2007).
- Handley, Paul M. (2006) *The King Never Smiles. A Biography of Thailand's Bhumibol Adulyadej*, New Haven: Yale University Press.
- INN Editorial Board (2006) *Patiwat 49 [The 2006 Revolution]*, Bangkok: Samnakngan phum ruam duay chuay kan.
- Ji Ungpakorn (2007) *A Coup for the Rich. Thailand's Political Crisis*, Bangkok: Workers Democracy Publishing.

- Macpherson, C.B. (1977) *The Life and Times of Liberal Democracy*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- McCargo, Duncan and Ukrist Pathamanand (2005) *The Thaksinization of Thailand*, Copenhagen: NIAS Press.
- Mellor, William (2007) "Thai King Strengthens Grip on Stocks as Nation's No. 1 Investor," Bloomberg.com, <http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20670001> (downloaded 1 August 2007).
- Pasuk Phongpaichit and C. Baker (2004) *Thaksin: The Business of Politics in Thailand*, Chiangmai: Silkworm Books.
- Robison, R., K. Hewison and G. Rodan (1993) "Political Power in Industrialising Capitalist Societies: Theoretical Perspectives," in K. Hewison, R. Robison and G. Rodan (eds), *Southeast Asia in the 1990s: Authoritarianism, Democracy and Capitalism*, Sydney: Allen & Unwin, pp. 9-38.
- Surin Pitsuwan (2006) "Is There Such a Thing as a Good Coup?" <http://www.ipsnewsasia.net/en/node/405> (downloaded 25 July 2006).